The five papers contained in this special issue were inspired by discussions during the 3rd Madeira Workshop on Belief Revision, Argumentation, Ontologies, and Norms (BRAON-2017) . This collection includes research advanced from the interaction between these areas of research concerned with the epistemic state of an agent. As such, these papers reflect dissimilar perspectives that have contributed to advance the understanding of such a hard and stimulating problem. Our purpose in offering this collection is to reach a wider audience and stimulate research on this compelling topic. We believe that the interaction between Belief Revision and Argumentation will help advance the goals of understanding them separately, and more broadly, understanding the cognitive architecture of a reasoning agent.
In Impossibility Results for Belief Contraction, by Sven Ove Hansson, the author show how three apparently weak and plausible conditions cannot be satisfied by a contraction operator acting on belief sets since they are logically incompatible.
In the survey A Review of the Relations Between Logical Argumentation and Reasoning with Maximal Consistency by Ofer Arieli, AnneMarie Borg and Jesse Heyninck, a selection of results associating Dung-style semantics for different logical argumentation frameworks and particular forms of reasoning with maximally consistent sets of premises. The author also explores the formalisms considering some rationality postulates, carrying the analysis to the corresponding proof systems in nonmonotonic reasoning.
The work presented in Two AGM-Style Characterizations of Model Repair by Paulo T. Guerra and Renata Wassermann, formally examines model repair under the perspective of the AGM theory. Two forms of obtaining model repair are described-one through belief sets an another by means of structural changes. Different sets of postulates are advanced and examined in relation to the intuitive rationality of the problem of model repair and presenting two representation results formulating the connection between them.
In Probability, Coherent Belief and Coherent Belief Change, by John Cantwell and Hans Rott, the authors analyze the statics and dynamics of belief states where these states are formalized as pairs that include the agent's credences and their categorical beliefs; the first is described as a subjective probability measure and the second expressed as a set of possible worlds. This framework is properly examined considering the principles of Inclusion and Preservation for belief revision and the principle of Recovery for belief withdrawals, and the Levi and Harper identities.
Finally, the paper entitled Practical Reasoning Using Values: An Argumentative Approach Based on a Hierarchy of Values by Juan C. L. Teze, Antoni Perelló-Moragues, Lluis Godo and Pablo Noriega, introduces a formal framework based on defeasible argumentation to support the choice of actions of a value-driven agent and arrange these actions into plans matching the agent's preferences. The values the agent considers are assumed as satisfying a partial order in a hierarchy that which is employed in the resolution of conflicts between incommensurable values.
We want to acknowledge and extend our deeply felt appreciation to everyone who has contributed to this issue and to the Madeira Workshop series, particularly the participants, authors, and reviewers. It has become a source of inspiration for the work on the common area that combines Belief Revision and Argumentation. Finally, and distinctly, we also thank the editorial and publishing staff at Springer for their support, especially Martin Golumbic, editor-in-chief of the Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence.
